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ABSTRACT
Protecting the confidentiality of a patient's information in a shared care environment could
become a complex task. Correct identification of users, assigning of access permissions, and
resolution of conflict rise as main points of interest in providing solutions for data exchange
among health care providers. Traditional approaches such as Mandatory Access Control,
Discretionary Access control and Role-Based Access Control policies do not always provide a
suitable solution for health care settings, especially for shared care environments. The core of this
contribution consists in the description of an approach which uses attribute-based encryption to
protect the confidentiality of patients’ information during the exchange of electronic health
records among healthcare providers. Attribute-based encryption allows the reinforcing of access
policies and reduces the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information; it also provides a set
of functionalities which are described using a case study. Attribute-based encryption provides an
answer to restrictions presented by traditional approaches and facilitate the reinforcing of existing
security policies over the transmitted data.

INTRODUCTION
In a shared care paradigm, remote access to distant data repositories along with the exchange of
relevant electronic health records (EHRs) becomes essential for providing integral health care
services. Internet is the natural platform to support such functionalities. However, the insecure
nature of the network and the increased amount of health information transmitted through it raise
the concern over the secure exchange of EHRs (Ohno-Machadoa, Silveira, & Vinterbo, 2004). In
fact, the disclosure, transmission and use of patient’s data for delivering health care services are
an expanding practice that concerns the interest of health institutions, physicians and patients. In a
dynamic and demanding environment, such as health care, a patient’s confidentiality can only be
guaranteed by incorporating security services and mechanisms along with common security
policies and/or conflict resolution policies to protect the data at any given point(Lopez & Blobel,
2009). Additionally, EHR systems not only should assure the protection of patients’ privacy and
confidentiality but also guarantee the reliability and integrity of the information gathered by
health care professionals (Conrick & Newell, 2006). Therefore, it is essential that health
information systems consider the privacy and integrity of the data and also allow the safe retrieval
of information for primary and secondary uses, especially in an interconnected health information
scenario (Lusignan, Chan, Theadom, & Dhoul, 2007).
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In this context, projects centered in the interconnection of health information systems, such as
national health information initiatives or multi-domain EHR systems, not only confront
information and functional requirements, such as the development and implementation of
standardized communication protocols, standardized vocabulary and homogeneous development
frameworks, but also privacy and security requirements. Protection of a patient’s privacy and the
secure disclosure of health information are crucial functionalities that should be embedded within
the specifications of modern and reliable electronic health record systems (Conrick & Newell,
2006; Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004; Safran, et al., 2007). Moreover, to guarantee the secure
transmission and release of health information in a shared care paradigm, the protection of a
patient’s privacy has to be conceived as an issue which combines the secure transmission of data,
correct user authentication, access control and security policies, either at the point of origin or at
the destination of the communication channel.
During the exchange of EHRs, even when the transmission has been between trusted parties,
access permission can be violated under specific circumstances. Consider a scenario in which
health care institutions A and B are trusted parties during the exchange of information. Using
public key technologies both institutions can transmit information using a secure channel. The
secure channel guarantees confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted information. However,
the existence of different access policies may lead to a violation of access permissions either at
the point of origin or when the information reaches its destination. Blobel et al. have suggested
the definition of common domain policies to address differences or conflicts rising from
disparities in the definition of security and access policies existing among health care
organizations (Blobel, Nordberg, Davis, & Pharow, 2006). However, implementing this approach
requires the existence of standardized vocabularies and common policy structures, which is
limited in the actual health information infrastructure. There is also a virtual agreement that for
communication of medical information and posterior access to the data, access policies based on
role-based access control models may facilitate the overcoming of possible violation of access
permission (Blobel, et al., 2006; Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004). However, role-based access
control models also present issues that may increase the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive
medical data (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008).
This chapter aims to address the issues of secure transmission of data, access control and user
privileges and propose a specification for an information exchange model that allows a secure and
safe approach for the exchange and release of EHR in a shared care scenario. Assuming that
transmission of medical information is maintained over insecure channels, we propose a policy
reinforcement model based on attribute-based encryptions and incorporate security mechanisms
in order to protect patients’ privacy during the exchange and release of the information.

BACKGROUND
Electronic health record should not only be considered as a replacement for paper-based medical
records but also means to facilitate the quicker/easier access to relevant health information. EHRs
also facilitate the implementation of information architectures to provide support to shared care
environments, where communication between the staff involved in imparting care to a patient as
well as remote access to data repositories are essential activities. In general, the historical
information maintained within the health repositories can also be used as a supporting and
knowledge base for continuing treatment of the patient, a base of information for further
treatment of the same patient, and base-knowledge for advanced research and medical education.

2

Security and privacy of patients’ EHRs
The nature of a medical record can be described as information provided by a uniquely vulnerable
human being, worried in some manner about the core of his/her very existence, to a trusted person
with superior knowledge (Eddy, 2000). In fact, modern electronic health records contain
extremely personal and sensitive information regarding not only health history but also the
dietary habits, sexual orientation, sexual activities, employment status, income, eligibility for
public assistance and family history of a patient (Choi, Capitan, Krause, & Streeper, 2006).
Therefore, sharing EHRs raises concerns over the legal and ethical implications associated to the
unauthorized access and release of personal information, and the effects that this may cause to the
patient (Anderson, 2007; Conrick & Newell, 2006). Patients understand the importance of
retaining medical information to support and improve the delivery of health care even when they
recognize both the sensitive nature of the collected data and the fact that information contended
by computerized health information system becomes more accessible to health professional,
administrative and medical staff, and third parties (Conrick & Newell, 2006). Patients expect
secure health information systems in which personal data is protected and any disclosed
information would be used only for health care purposes (Grain, 2006).
Safe access and exchange of electronic health information requires not only the secure
transmission of data but also to ensure that information will be disclosed only to those with the
correct access privileges. This implies that protection of patients’ privacy needs to be conserved
at the source point, when it is transmitted and when it reaches the destination point. In order to
protect sensitive medical data, the principles of “need to know” and relevance apply. Under this
premise users should be allowed to access a patient's EHR in order to obtain the relevant
information to carry out a task in concordance with the access and security policies of the
organization in which the patient has been treated (Blobel, 2004; Garson & Adams, 2008). The
principle of need-to-know is driven by the relevance that the accessed information has in the
support of the patient care. However, relevancy is an ambiguous concept that depends on the
context in which the information is generated and the purposes for which the data has been
released. Consequently, the information accessed by a physician should be relevant but also
sufficient to provide health care services (van der Linden, Kalra, Hasman, & Talmon, 2009).
Securing medical information is not only a social, ethical and technological matter, but is also
about the establishment of well defined privacy policies and legislation. The legal duty of
confidentiality is embedded in the professional relationship between physician and patient, and
therefore, an essential aspect to be considered when exchanging medical records. From a
perspective in which the mobility of patients as well as the exchange of information becomes
more usual, the definition of means to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the patients in an
efficient way becomes even more necessary. Both security services and mechanisms are essential
for allowing access to authorized users as well as for protecting sensitive medical information
during the exchange of data (Blobel, et al., 2006). Therefore, it is essential for health information
systems to consider both the protection and privacy of patient’s data but also the safe and
authorized retrieval of information. At this point, it is important to consider that adding excessive
security measures could lead to an inefficient, more time demanding and less user friendly access
control methods. Defining the correct balance between security requirement and availability of
information is a critical goal in a complex environment such as health care (Lopez & Blobel,
2009).
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Security and privacy in a shared care paradigm
In a shared care environment, different health care units (HCU) are involved in the care process
as well as in maintaining accurate medical records. Indeed, in modern healthcare environments
different care services are offered by different HCU within the organization or in a healthcare
network that involves multiple organizations. This requires the communication and cooperation
among all actors involved in the administration of patients’ care (Choi, et al., 2006). Internet turns
into a natural environment for such functionalities by allowing the exchange of EHRs and the
interconnection of medical applications, thus facilitating better management of medical services
as well as faster treatment of patients (Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004).
As in paper-based health records, physicians have an ethical obligation of protecting patient
information in order to prevent potential harm to an individual. Nevertheless, the nature of EHRs
has transformed the duty of physician-patient confidentiality to a complex task. Despite the
personal nature of health records, EHRs make patient’s information potentially available to
anyone with access to a health information system (Anderson, 2007). Therefore, the
responsibility of protecting patient privacy has moved from an individual/local responsibility to a
duty shared among the different entities that share the information. This tendency is altering the
preexisting conception of the doctor–patient confidentiality and is threatening the quality of
health care (Choi, et al., 2006). These apprehensions are also shared by the public whose primary
concern is the security, privacy, confidentiality and protection of their personal health information
(Goldschmidt, 2005; Rash, 2005).
In a shared care paradigm defining what is considered sensitive information as well as what
access permissions are granted to users become uncertain. In fact, each participating institution of
a health network would have different approaches for defining the level of sensitivity associated
to the information, access rights and the level of security required to protect privacy of patients
(Blobel, et al., 2006). Those approaches not only depend on legal restrictions but also are built
based on the accumulated experience and the culture of organizations. Since the conception of
security and protection of patient’s privacy differ from one organization to another, methods for
interconnecting health information systems should include comprehensive understanding of the
complexity of requirements involving the secure exchange and release of medical data. In
general, an electronic health record system able to secure and protect the confidentiality of
patients should not only incorporate security requirements but also guarantee the flow and
availability of the information.
Implementing a shared care environment has several implications not only in how the
information is managed or which technology can be used but also in the way in which
information is collected, stored and accessed. The exchange of information in a shared care
environment exceeds the needs of a locally integrated health information system and requires the
definition of a new set of requirements. Even more, it requires a different approach to overcoming
the technical, legal and ethical issues that rise from exchanging highly sensitive information. In a
shared care paradigm, the number of specialist that can have access to EHRs increases and the
information contained by EHRs can be broken down among different health information systems
within the organization or among different healthcare providers, increasing the possibility of a
security breach. In general, the implementation of the share care paradigm not only requires the
support of standardized information systems architectures, data exchange protocols and common
vocabularies but also protecting the privacy of patients, guaranteeing the authorized access to
stored data and protecting the integrity of the information (Blobel, et al., 2006).
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Securing the exchange of EHRs
Secure exchange and disclosure of electronic health records over insecure channels such as
internet requires the implementation of comprehensive security policies and technologies that
allows the exchange of data whilst the protection of patient’s privacy is guaranteed (Choe & Yoo,
2007). These policies and technologies should provide mechanisms for access control and define
access privileges for information management and protection of data privacy (Blobel, et al., 2006;
Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004). During the electronic exchange of medical data, patient’s sensitive
information always has to be protected; especially the information considered sensitive due to the
legal and ethical consequences that unauthorized releases could carry. The unauthorized access
and release of sensitive information are considered a breach of confidentiality and could lead to
issues of public concern such as discrimination, embarrassment or economic harm (OhnoMachadoa, et al., 2004). At this point, several issues have to be considered: (1) the origin of the
information, (2) the reason for its release, (3) secure transmission of data and (4) protection of
patient’s privacy.
The origin of the information refers to who and where the data has been collected. Health
information can be collected by different organizations and can serve a variety of purposes, and
its storage can be local or external. Information locally stored can be promptly available and can
normally be accessed by user at any time and location within the organization. On the contrary,
external health data is usually retrieved from information systems that do not provide direct
access rights to users. In this case, access rights are provided based on common agreements
between the organizations involved (Lopez & Blobel, 2009; van der Linden, et al., 2009).
The reason for the disclosure of information is an important element in defining an efficient
security strategy. Detailed and grained information is normally required to offer primary services
such as the treatment of a subject of care. On the contrary, information required for secondary
uses should not be linkable to the patient (Agrawala & Johnson, 2007). The destination of the
information also affects the definition of a security strategy. Local security needs substantially
vary from the requirement of a shared care scenario (van der Linden, et al., 2009). Locally,
standard security measures and standardized messages allow the secure access and disclosure of
information. However, the secure exchange and release of information among different health
providers not only depends on secure and standardized electronic mechanisms but also on
standardized security and access policies (Lopez & Blobel, 2009).

PROTECTING PATIENT’S PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Social, ethical and legal perspective
The benefits of electronic health records and how the use of this technology could impact in
society are still open for debate. Nonetheless, the general perception is that incorporating EHRs to
medical practice provides support in the delivery of health care by facilitating access to historical
medical data (Agrawala & Johnson, 2007; Anderson, 2007). EHRs provide an instrument to
maintain non-fragmented and actualized health information.
The information collected in EHRs has a historical character and correspond to the lifelong
medical records of an individual. A perfect EHR would be a complete health history of the
patient’s encounters with health system (Berner, 2008). However, having the complete medical
history raises concerns over how the confidentiality of the information would be protected.
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Traditionally, protecting the confidentiality of the information has been the responsibility of the
physician and/or the institution that holds the patient’s medical records. In a shared care setting,
the provision of health care services becomes a multitask activity in which the interaction of
multiple actors is required not only for providing health care but also in protecting the
confidentiality of health records.
Under this complex scenario countries such as U.S., Canada, Japan and the member of the
European Union have incorporated laws and regulations that aim to reduce fraud and abuse as
well as protect patients’ information (Anderson, 2007). International regulations such as that
imposed by HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) and the European Data
Protection Directive (Agrawala & Johnson, 2007; Lusignan, et al., 2007) demand the highest
level of security and protection during the access, processing and exchange of information that
involve sensitive data of individuals. Australia also possesses a set of privacy principles that
regulates the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. Additionally, Australian
legislation protects and provides a legal body for people that have suffered harm as a product of
unauthorized disclosure or use of private information.

Challenges of Securing Electronic Health Records
Securing electronic health records, in a scenario where information is potentially accessed by
multiple actors, could become a complex and costly activity. To provide a framework for secure
maintenance and release of health care information, the European Committee for Standardization
has released a set of information security standards for health information systems (CEN-ENV,
2000a, 2000b, 2000c). CEN standards recognize four global security needs that any health
information system should accomplish Availability, confidentiality, integrity and accountability
(CEN-ENV, 2000a).
Availability of the information is a key factor for functional electronic health record systems;
users with the right to access information should be allowed to do so in order to perform their
duties. However, to protect the confidentiality of the information, access to patient’s data should
be carried out under the principles of relevance and need-to-know (Garson & Adams, 2008). The
principle of relevance prevents the information overload and protects the patient’s privacy by
restricting the release of information to the relevant data required to support the health care
process (Berner, 2008; van der Linden, et al., 2009). In the same way, the principle of “need-toknow” guarantees that only personnel who required the information and have the access
privileges will be allowed to extract the data. Defining the correct balance between availability
and security requirement of information is a critical goal in a complex environment such as health
care.
A security breach poses a threat for protecting the integrity of electronic health records as well
as for providing reliable information for accountability purposes. Integrity of the information is
not only guaranteed by incorporating additional security mechanisms within the system or for
securing a communication channel, when information is exchanged between systems, but also by
ensuring that only authorized user can have access, add or alter stored data. In shared care
environment controlling who is accessing the information turns into complex and time demanding
task. Indeed, the solo fact that existing authentication methods, such as PIN or passwords, allows
unauthorized delegation of access permissions threaten the integrity and validity of the
information (Heckle & Lutters, 2007; Shin, et al., 2008). Accountability of information also
becomes less accurate when non-authorized users are able to access and manipulate data
regardless of the fact that they do not have the privileges to execute such activities.
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Analysis of traditional methods
In a shared care context the concepts of privacy, confidentiality, and security become essential for
secure exchange of electronic health records. To provide a secure, safe and reliable environment
for co-operation and communication, several security requirements need to be taken into
consideration. Security may not only consider the services that will be implemented to avoid the
unauthorized access to sensitive information but also mechanisms that prevent unauthorized
release of patient’s data.
Existing authentication and access control models require safekeeping PINs, passwords or
smartcards in order to provide access to restricted facilities and information. However the nature
of the activities executed by physicians and medical personnel requires mobility and multiple
accesses to different terminal within the organization or even remotely in the case of web based
health information systems or integrated multi-domain systems (Garson & Adams, 2008; Shin, et
al., 2008). Considering that access to different systems may require multiple authentication
methods, it is usual to find that PINs and passwords are maintained stored on the computer
terminals used by physicians, stick papers on the office, laboratories, medical consult or at home,
or become a simple combination of well known numbers or digits such as phone extension, date
of birth or pseudonyms which are easy to remember but also relatively less efficient in avoiding
security breaches (Garson & Adams, 2008; Shin, et al., 2008). The use of smartcards also may
present certain disadvantages such as deterioration and accidental lost. Additionally, if physicians
forget their PIN/passwords or misplace their smartcards a reissuance process must take place
(Shin, et al., 2008). Consequently, existing models become inappropriate and less reliable for a
medical environment.
Other issue associated to the use of traditional model is medical disputes generated by
delegation of authentication codes (Chen, et al., 2008; Heckle & Lutters, 2007). Delegation of
private authentication codes is generated when a member of a hospital’s medical staff delegates
his PIN/password or other authentication feature to other physician or nurse to access, modify or
add information on behalf of the owner of the private authentication codes (Heckle & Lutters,
2007; Shin, et al., 2008). The delegation of access rights may grant access to sensitive
information to non-authorized user by breaking established policies of information privacy and
confidentiality (Heckle & Lutters, 2007; Shin, et al., 2008). This also may have legal
repercussions when restricted information is leaked to third parties without the proper
authorization of the patient or when the addition of erroneous information compromises the safety
of patients.

Traditional Access control models
In the following pages traditional access control models, such as DAC, MAC, RBAC, will be
presented. In order to do so, a paradigm will be used (see Figure 1), where a doctor needs to
acquire information regarding a patient’s medical history from another institutions in order to
handle the patient’s case. Figure 2 presents a graphical representation of the relation and flow of
information of the actors historically involved in the treatment of patient A described in Figure 1.
The paradigm used presents difficulties that arise in providing health care in today’s
interconnected medical environments. These difficulties require efficient access control
mechanisms in order to ensure security, for example, in the scenario discussed only doctor ‘DC’
who has the patient’s consent accesses the patient’s medical data. Traditional access control
models try to cope with these kinds of difficulties giving access to a patient’s EHR only to the
rightful owner.
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68 years old lady 'A' was admitted to the hospital 'HA' with abdominal pain and
doctor 'DC' has been assigned to her case. The patient has indicated having a history
of chronic diseases. 'A' has been previously hospitalized at hospital 'HB' for chest
pain and followed up treatment with the cardiologist 'C' for Atrial Fibrillation,
Hypertension and Recurrent Angina, also radiological information of the patient are
maintain in the hospital records. Additionally, she has been diagnosed with diabetes
for 20 years and has been visiting clinic 'CL' for her regular medical treatment. She
has checked her blood according to the doctor's order at the local pathology 'P'
regularly. 'A' has also been seen by the Dietitian 'D', Ophthalmologist 'O', podiatrist
'PO', Exercise Physician 'EX' for her diabetes and diabetes related complications.
She visited gynecologist 'G' for postmenopausal symptoms 2 years back and had an
episode of knee pain 3 weeks ago having taken an x'ray at the Radiology 'R'. She is
on several medications for different conditions. As an elderly lady with multiple
pathologies, the doctor 'DC' has decided to trace back her history from her healthcare
providers. The patient has also given consent for the doctor to do that.
Figure 1: Case Analysis

Figure 2: Case analysis, interaction and expected flow of information

Mandatory Access control
Mandatory access control polices (MAC) govern access based on classification of subjects and
objects within a system. The access control decision is made by a centralized authority that
determine, on one hand, the level of security required for each object and, on the other hand, the
trustworthiness level of subjects for accessing the protected information (R. S. Sandhu &
Samarati, 1994). Access control is based on comparing security levels, which indicate how
sensitive data is and is performed by assessing security clearances, which indicate the entities that
are allowed to access such data. To access the information a subject should have at least a level of
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security clearance equal to the security level of the object being accessed (Stallings & Brown,
2008). MAC policies established that users cannot delegate access rights in this way enforcing
protection of the data “level”, this guarantees the confidentiality of the accessed data (Stallings &
Brown, 2008). MAC policies also allow the establishment of fine-grained access rights over data
and, at the same time, reinforce established access restrictions. However, MAC policies are rather
rigid which make them unsuitable for a shared care environment, especially considering that in
MAC more than one security level cannot be assigned to the same data object (Hafner et. all,
2008).
For example, in our previous mentioned paradigm, a situation where information of patient 'A'
is maintained under MAC policies, doctor 'DC' will be required to provide the necessary
clearances to retrieve the data from clinic 'CL' and hospital HB information systems. In this case,
the data fields confining patient 'A' information would be maintained labelled with different
levels of security accordant with the sensitivity of the information. Doctor 'DC' would be able to
retrieve the data that reflect the access right provided by the clearances that he possesses. In fact,
to maintain the principles of need-to-know and relevance 'DC' would only have access to the
relevant information needed to perform the task. However, a physician with the same security
clearances to 'DC' would also be allowed to access the retrieved data, which would not reflect the
consent provided by patient 'A' to doctor 'DC'. MAC policies are centered on the level of
sensitivity of the information rather that rights and permissions that users or user groups have to
access the data, which does not allow discriminating among users with the same clearances.
Furthermore, in a shared care context where data can be exchanged between multiple
organizations, delegated and accessed by multiple users in a need-to-know base, users can play
different roles and have access to information under different contexts (Alhaqbani & Fidge,
2008). However, delegation of information and establishing hierarchies of access permissions are
not allowed by MAC policies. In general, although MAC policies are less complex to define and
allow the establishment of fine-grained access permissions based on the sensitivity of the
information, they are extremely rigid for a health care environment, especially in managing users
and user groups and delegation of access permissions (Hafner, Memon, & Alam, 2008)

Discretionary access control
Discretionary access control (DAC) is based on the identity of the requestor (user or system
process) and on access rules, which establishes what the requestor is allowed to do. Access will
be granted to the user accordantly to the permissions that the user has over the object at the
moment of accessing it. DAC policies allow users to provide access permissions to another entity
(user or system process). However, they do not impose restriction on how information will be
managed when it is received by a user. In fact, a user could pass the data to another user not
authorized to access it.
A key element of DAC is the ownership of the information, especially because owners are
allowed to grant access to the stored data. However, in health care ownership of the information
is not always clear. In fact, EHRs belong to a patient but are created and modified by health care
professionals and the information is not only shared but also could be maintained by different
health organizations which could claim ownership of the data (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008; Hafner,
et al., 2008). Considering the situation of patient 'A', the data retrieved by doctor 'DC' from clinic
'CL' and Hospitals 'HA' and 'HB' correspond to her personal health information; however
ownership of the data is not clear. In the case of patient ‘A’, contents of her electronic health
records have been created and accessed by physicians of the three organizations as well as
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information has been collected from other external sources (radiology results and postmenopausal
symptoms in the case of clinic 'CL'). Additionally, patient 'A' electronic health records is
distributed in the information systems of all three organizations that, in principle, would have
different access principles and security policies. The example shows that information could be
created by various collaborative partners that could not claim complete ownership of the data.
Although, access policies are flexible, the model lacks the ability of supporting dynamic
change of access rights. Additionally, fined grained access privileges are difficult to be managed,
especially when users are allowed to grant access right to other users. DAC is centered in users
rather than user groups; however, if the model is extended by including categories or group
definitions, group management is possible.
In general, DAC policies are less complex to implement if compared to RBAC, they are also
flexible but still restricted for a shared care environment and increase the complexity of defining
fine-grained access to stored data. Implementing DAC in shared care settings could result in
additional security problems (R. S. Sandhu & Samarati, 1994; Stallings & Brown, 2008).

Role-based access control and exchange of EHRs
Most of the existing researches consider role-based access control (RBAC) as a mechanism to
guarantee authorized access to electronic health resources, especially during the exchange of
EHRs. Role-based access control (RBAC) is used to protect information resources from
unauthorized access based on the roles that user could have or perform within an organization.
RBAC was first introduced by David Ferraiolo and Richard Kuhn in 1992 as a mean to provide
manageable access privileges to identifiable groups of users (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992). The
Ferraiolo-Kuhn model was later integrated with the framework proposed by Sandhu et al.(R. S.
Sandhu, Coynek, Feinsteink, & Youmank, 1996) and published as the NIST RBAC model in
2000 (R. Sandhu, Ferraiolot, & Kuhnt, 2000). The integrated framework proposed by Ferraiolo,
Sandhu and Richard was adopted as ANSI/INCITS standard in 2004.
The central idea of the RBAC model is that users can perform multiple roles and roles can be
associated to multiple access permissions. In RBAC permissions are represented by the relation
existing between resources and operations over those resources (Lee, Kim, Kim, & Yeh, 2004).
In practice, RBAC models are based on access policies defined in terms of permissions that are
associated with roles assigned to users. Permissions will determinate the operations that a role is
able to perform on information resources and, therefore, all users that have assigned that specific
role (Kim, Ray, France, & Li, 2004).
Even though the RBAC model has been successfully implemented in several domains, in the
healthcare it presents several issues that need to be considered. Some of these issues are described
in the following situations which are described using the case presented in Figure 1.
Roles definitions
Role can be defined based on the structure of the organization or functions that performs
members within the organization. This could lead to an ambiguous definition of access
permission that can generate security issues when information is exchanged among organizations.
Since in RBAC models operations are generically assigned to roles, it is difficult to separate into
individual access permissions. However, when the patient 'A' is admitted to 'HA', the assignation
of the access permission is done based on the consent given by the patient and not by the access
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privileged that could be associated to roles. For example, the patient will be treated by
Cardiologist 'CA-A' but not the Cardiologist 'CA-B'. Therefore, even though both Cardiologists
could have the same role, only cardiologist attending A should be allowed to access the patient’s
information. Furthermore, in a shared care environment the team of physicians taking care of
patient A should be the only ones with access to his medical records. In this case roles are not
sufficient to determine access privileges, but the function of the physician within the team or been
part of the team. In reality access to the health information is given to the members of the 'team'
treating the patient and not to all physicians with similar roles within the organization. Under
these conditions, role-base access control will not provide a suitable solution to the problem of
restricting access to those users that are not taking part of the patient treatment.
Since in role-based access control models access permissions are determined by the role assigned
to a user, the control that the patient has over the access to specific and sensitive information will
be intrinsically limited. In fact, in a conventional RBAC model patient A would not control
whatsoever over permission assigned to his medical records.

Combining and extending Access control models
Alhaqbani and Fidge proposed a security access control protocol based on a three level access
security model (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008). The proposed protocol combines Discretionary
Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Role-Based access control in
hierarchically layered security mechanism, which determine access to data depending on a set of
rules and policies evaluated at each level. According to the access hierarchy of the model, access
to sensitive information will be determined by a Mandatory Access Control Policy, which
provides a solution to the previously described scenario. However, implementation of this model
in a shared care environment would be rather complex. The complexity of EHRs would limit the
usability of DAC in a shared care setting since role definition can differ among health providers.
Moreover, the complexity of all models could be reduced by reinforcing the policy that
allows/restrict access to information stated as sensitive.
Motta and Furuie proposed a Contextual Role-Based Access Control (C-RBAC) model which
extends the conventional RBAC definitions by including contextual information to determine
access permissions to patients’ data (Motta & Furuie, 2003). In this case, the model allows the
statement of pacific restriction by adding contextual data to restrict the access to the information.
Context information such as physicians assessing of patient, location and time can be used to
determine if a user can be granted with access to information. The model was developed to be
flexible in granting fine-grained access privileges in large health care centers using RBAC.
Nonetheless, its definition and structure limits the model to local environments, which made the
model unsuitable for shared care environments with participation of multiple health care
providers.
Peleg et. al proposed a solution based on contextual RBAC which considers definition of
scenarios, which are called situations, in which user would be allowed to access EHRs. Situations
are described and classified, and each classification would define a pattern that can be applied
when a user is requesting access to information (Peleg, Beimel, Dori, & Denekamp, 2008). The
Situation Role-Based Access Control (S-RBAC) model could also be used to manage access
permissions over remote repositories by applying patterns that define situations in which interinstitutional exchange of information is allowed. However, the model was developed using a
patient centric approach which did not directly consider requirements of all possible stakeholders.
Additionally, since the model is based on RBAC, conflicting roles and access policies would be

11

expected when data is exchanged among different health care providers, which will increase the
complexity in defining situational patterns for data exchange and release. Also, if additional
health providers and all possible stakeholders scenarios are described and included, the number of
pattern would potentially increase as well as the complexity of managing access permissions.
Table 1: Comparison of access control policies
Complexity
Multiple
users
Policy
management
Fine-Grained
access
Pros

MAC
Low
Restricted

DAC
Low
Restricted

RBAC
Medium
Possible

C-RBAC
High
Possible

S-RBAC
High
Possible

Rigid/Restricted

Flexible/Restricted

Applicable

Applicable

Applicable

Applicable

Restricted

Restricted

Applicable

Applicable

Policies are Flexible

Allows management
of access right at
group level

Considers the
contextual
information to
determine finegrained access to
medical records

Considers the
contextual
information to
determine finegrained access to
medical records

Guarantees
protection over
accessed data
Allow Fine-Grained
access restrictions

Cons

Facilitate the
management of
access right in large
organizations

Protection policies
are centered on the
information rather
that user or user
groups.

Establishment of
ownership over the
data is rather difficult
in shared care
environments.

Difficult to
implement in large
organization with
multiple user and
groups accessing the
data

The model lack the
ability to support
dynamic change of
access right
It is limited and
difficult to manage in
a shared care
scenarios

Lacks the ability to
specify fine-grained
access right for users
Constraints are not
flexible
Different role
definitions could be
present when
information is
exchange among
health providers

Is not designed for
share care settings

Is designed for share
care settings
Model is patient is
mainly patient
centered, and does
not consider all
stakeholders
Level of complexity
potentially increase
with the inclusion of
additional situations
Different role
definitions could be
present when
information is
exchange among
health providers

Attribute-Based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has its origins in Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes,
firstly proposed in (Boneh & Franklin, 2001). The IBE scheme allows a sender to encrypt a
message using an identity without incorporating a public key infrastructure (Sahai & Waters,
2005; Shamir, 1985). In this case, the identity is viewed as a string of characters (e.g. user’s
name, an email address, or telephone number) which serves as a user’s public key (Liu, Guo, &
Zhang, 2009). A private key, which is provided by a trusted private key generator (PKG), is used
to decrypt the data. The private key is provided only if the user has been successfully identified
by the PKG (Au, et al., 2008)
Sahai and Waters (Sahai & Waters, 2005, 2008) introduced the notion of attribute-based
encryption (ABE) as a new mechanism for reinforcing access control. The attribute-based
encryption approach allows a ciphertexts to be decrypted by more than one recipient, unlike the
traditional public key cryptography methods (Bethencourt, Sahai, & Waters, 2007). In its place,
both the users’ private keys and ciphertexts are associated with a set of attributes or policies that
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are used to grant access to the encrypted data. Attributes are defined as set of strings, in this case
represented by access policies, which are associated to an access structure applied to the
encrypted data. A user would be able to decrypt an encrypted data only if he/she possesses a
private key with attributes that overlap the attributes used in the ciphertext (Bethencourt, et al.,
2007; Ibraimi, Tang, Hartel, & Jonker, 2009). In other words, to allow a user to decrypt a
ciphertext, at least k attributes must overlap between the identity used to generate the ciphertext
and his private keys. Note that not all but k attributes are sufficient to grant access to the
encrypted data, which is represented as an error-tolerance in the model (Sahai & Waters, 2008).
This error-tolerance allows the implementation of Fuzzy Identities or Attribute-Based Encryption
schemes for biometric technology (Sahai & Waters, 2005).
In this section, we will present and describe an Attribute-Based Encryption scheme and how it
can be applied to protect the information of parties during the exchange and release of EHRs.

An approach for securing EHRs exchange and applications
Considering the case in Figure 1, Hospitals 'HA', 'HB' and Clinic 'CL' have previously agreed in a
set of principles that allow them the exchange of information. Those principles have been set on
contracts that permit the transference of any relevant data regarding health history which can be
required during the treatment of a patient. All institutions have defined independent security
approaches and mechanism for protecting the information that is managed on their system, HA
and HB being public hospitals and according to the health policy guidelines for a public hospital,
CL, being a General Practice, following the guideline for security from the General Practice
Computing Group. Therefore, there could be differences in access control, security and
information release polices. To avoid controversies policy reinforcing method is used during the
exchange and release of information. The method proposed is reinforcing security policies by
using attribute-based encryption scheme. In this case, the access policies are used to encrypt the
information that has been exchanged, allowing only users with the correct access privileges to
decrypt and access the information.
Data Encryption
Considering the scenarios described previously, the exchanged information is maintained
encrypted until an authorized user, with the sufficient k attributes, proceeds to decrypt the
message completely or partially. In this case, a secret key, SK, is used to decrypt the ciphertext
encrypted with the initial attribute set (access policies), Ap, if and only if the attributes that the
user possesses are sufficient as measured by the “set overlap” distance metric for the security
policies used to encrypt the data (Sahai & Waters, 2005). To decrypt the message, a private key is
also needed. The scheme requires of a trusted authority, known as the Private Key Generator
(PKG), with the task of generating the private key (SK). The PKG will provide such a private key
only after the user has been successfully identified (Au, et al., 2008). The generated key can then
be used to decrypt the ciphertext originally received from the sender (see Figure 3). In the
following, k denotes the minimal number of attributes that the user must have in order to decrypt
the message or part of it.
This approach guarantees that only users that have access privileges would be allowed to
access the encrypted data. The access privileges are described by the security policies used to
encrypt the data. A user that does not have the attributes required to decrypt the data will not be
able to access the information. If the security policies attached are hierarchically associated to
information, the access could be provided at different levels for different users. In this case, user
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will be able to access different level or contents within the encrypted data depending on the
attributes associated to their access privileges.

Figure 3: Attribute-based encryption

Enforcing of access control policies and secure transference of data
Information exchange
After patient A is admitted to hospital 'HA' and her first encounter with physician 'DC', doctor
'DC' starts recollecting patient 'A' historical medical data. The recollection starts with the remote
request of data from clinic 'CL' and hospital 'HB' health information systems. To guarantee the
confidentiality of the information, the data is encrypted using attributes associated to physician
'DC'. Since the transference of data is done by reinforcing access policies only doctor 'DC' will
initially be authorized to decrypt the data provided by clinic 'CL' and hospital 'HB'. Considering
that patient 'A' will not only be treated by physician 'DC' but also by a team of physicians and
medical staff, the access permissions will eventually be modified in order to provide access to all
personnel involved in with patient’s 'A' care. This can be done by providing a private Key to each
member of the staff assuming responsibility with patient’s 'A' care; each member will be allowed
to retrieve the information depending on the described access policies described by the attributes
associated to their private keys. For example, physician treating patient 'A' will have access to all
relevant medical history of the patient, on the contrary nurses and administrative staff would be
provided with restricted access to the data.

Encounter

Consent

Patient

<<Include>>

Doctor DC

Information
Request
Information
Access

MedicalStaff

Figure 4: Case use Scenario 1
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Analysis
This case presents a normal patient-physician encounter in which the historical information of
patient A can only be accessed by the primary physician at hospital 'HA' by Doctor 'DC'. To
simplify the analysis let us assume that the consent policy has been created during the first
encounter (steps 1 and 2 in Figure 6). As it has been described previously, the policy defines a set
of attributes that establishes who would be able to access the medical information of patient A. In
this case a set of attributes ({Pat.A},{Doc.GP, Clinic.CL}) is used to describe the access
permission to patient A’s information.
Even when the patient has progressed through the health system, the information gathered
from the counter, encounters and reports can be shared using electronic communication. An
information request made by doctor DC would start the process as shown in steps 3 and 4 of
Figure 6. The information in the EHRs of hospital 'HB' and clinic 'CL' can be encrypted using the
attributes ({Pat.A},{ Doc.DC, Depto.ME, Hosp.HA }) and send directly to the electronic health
record system in hospital HA, which is shown in steps 5 and 6 of Figure 6. In this case the access
policy for the data is described as M(data)= (Pat.A)  (Doc.DC  Depto.ME  Hosp.HA). Since
patient cannot possess a private key that includes the attributes {Doc.DC, Depto.ME, Hosp.HA }
the access tree has only two possible outcomes.

Figure 5: Access tree Patient’s Data
In this scenario, the transfer of information is directly managed between sender ('HB' and 'CL'
information systems) and receiver (Doctor 'DC'). Since the information is shared between
organizations the attribute { Doc.DC, Depto.ME, Hosp.HA } is applied to encrypt the relevant
medical information associated to patient A, and then sent to the HA’s information system.
HA information
System
Patient

1: Encounter

CL Information
System

HB Information
System

Doctor DC

2: Consent(): {Doc.DC,Hosp.HA}
3: Information Request1

4: Information Request2

5: M1(data)(): {Pat.A},{Doc.Dc,Dept.ME,Hosp.HA}

6: M2(data)(): {Pat.A},{Doc.Dc,Dept.ME,Hosp.HA}
7: Access(): {Doc.Dc,Dept.ME,Hosp.HA}

8: Patient data

Figure 6: Sequence Diagram Scenario 1
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The information collected and sent directly to the 'HA' systems, can be accessed by 'DC', as it
is illustrated in steps 7 and 8 of Figure 6. At this point, the transferred data has been protected
using an enforced access policy approach; therefore the information can only be accessed by
Doctor 'DC'. To provide access to other members of the staff access permissions can be modified
by associating new access key to the encrypted data. For example, by allowing Cardiology 'CAA' to have access the patient medical history. This delegation of access to specific users is
possible because attribute-based encryption supports partial delegation of access permissions. To
enforce that only 'CA-A' is able to access the data the information the following attributes will be
incorporated to the access permissions ({ Doctor.DC, Depto.ME}).
Access delegation and patient control over data access
Now consider the situation presented in role definition. According to the access and security
policies of hospital 'HA' only member of the team attending the patient can have access to his
EHRs. Since originally the information was requested and collected by doctor 'DC' of Medicine
department the data could be encrypted using the flowing attribute set M(data)= (Pat.A) 
(Doctor.DC Depto.ME). However, to allow other physicians access to patients 'A' data, a new
set of attributes need to be incorporated. In this case, physicians could be provided with private
key and assume specific responsibilities, which are described by a specific set of attributes
(policies). Additionally, information could restrict in some specific cases, which can be described
by a specific set of attributes (policies). Each specialist will be able to decrypt the data, which is
under his responsibility, but will not be able to decrypt the data that has been restricted. This
provides a solution for restricting access only to members of the team treating the patient and to
patient’s control over access permissions.
Analysis
Initially only doctor 'DC' has access to the patient information. To allow access to cardiology
'CA-A' a new set attribute can be added to the access policy of patient 'A', the new set will
incorporate attributes set associated to 'CA-A'. Since cardiology 'CA-A' works the Cardiology
department of hospital 'HA', the new set of attributes would be M(data)= (Pat.A)  (Doctor.DC
Depto.ME)  (Doctor.CA-A Depto.CAR). No other cardiologist will have the attributes
{Doctor.CA-A,Depto.CAR} associated to their access privileges, therefore no one else but CA-A
will be allowed to access and manipulate patients 'A' data. The new access tree has only three
possible outcomes:

Figure 7: Access tree considering access to cardiologist CA-A
When patient A provides consent to Doctor 'DC' to collect his historical medical information,
he could state that only physician involved in his case would have access to his psychiatric
history, denying access to other physicians and personnel of hospital 'HA'. In this case the access
Key of other physicians and personal will not allow them to access to the psychiatric history of

16

patient 'A'. the access to the information is stated according to the consent of the patient and the
access policies. The access then will incorporate the restrictions over information access, making
some of the information unable to access for other physicians even when they could have access
to the patient’s EHR.

CONCLUSIONS
Health information systems, in special Electronic Health Record (EHR), are considered crucial
sources of information for healthcare professionals and an essential instrument for delivery of
health care services. Nevertheless, the level of accessibility provided by health information
systems raises concern over the secure access and release of information, especially in share care
environments. In shared care context protecting the confidentiality of patients become the focus
of attention and a key element to be considered in the implementation of information interfaces
for data exchange among health care providers. Functional and reliable inter-domain EHRs
require the consideration shared concepts as well as standardized terminology and standardized
information architectures.
At the application level, the main security issue presented in approaches based on MAC and
DAC approaches are inflexibility of the policies, complexity in determining ownership of the
information, difficulty in implementing on large shared care environments and restriction
considering delegation and hierarchical access permissions to the data. Implementation based on
RBAC models present security issues associated to the ambiguities that exist in the definition of
roles and access privileges among organizations, the non-existence of a common and/or
standardized framework for defining roles and access privileges, lacking the ability of finegrained access to information. Extensions to RBAC have allowed the fine-grained definition of
access rights to data but at the same time increased the complexity of the models. The proposed
approaches have failed to provide suitable solutions for exchange of date in scenarios that involve
more than one health care provider.
In this chapter, we presented a security approach which reinforces access policies using
attribute-based encryption schemes. Attribute-based encryption allows the encryption decryption
of data based on polices, which are represented as attributes associated to the information. The
approach allows an independent but secure method to protect the privacy and confidentiality of a
patient information transmitted over insecure channels. The model is flexible in providing access
to multiple users based on security policies, which describe the access permissions over encrypted
data. The use of attribute-based encryption allows:
1. Control over access permissions of transmitted data: only user with the private access key
that satisfy the encryption protocol will be able to decrypt the exchange information.
2. Delegation of access permission: Access to information can be delegated/granted to other
users by providing an access key which satisfies the encryption protocols.
3. Protection of the patient’s data: the transmitted information is encrypted in a fashion in
which only users with the appropriate key will be able to decrypt the information. In
addition, data can only be accessed when a user possesses the appropriate access
permissions, and information is provided considering the principles of need-to-know and
relevance.
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4. Hierarchical access to rumpled data: User can access the complete information or part of

it, depending of the attribute set associated to the private key.
In conclusion, attribute-based encryption offers several security advantages over traditional
methods and also can be used for different purposes. In fact, it provides a flexible access control
mechanism that can be implemented under different circumstances. Future work in this area is to
explore and provide a suitable and scalable solution for complex health care environment. The
complexity of modern EHR systems require flexible solutions that can be adapted in a variety of
settings. In addition, the growing quantity and variety of the information collected by EHR
systems along its potential uses demand scalable solutions. Moreover, in a shared care
environment the number of interconnected systems and the potential numbers of users increase
the demand for secure mechanisms that can cope with an increasing need for highly sensitive
information.
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